I know I don’t know, but this is a continuous system and the probability of something being in one particular state is infinitely small ; the probability of it being in certain range of that particular state is, ahem, not, but with the amount of moving things in LLMs and in human brains there are most likely quite a few radical differences between laws describing them.
Why am I incorrect? You can’t disprove that there isn’t that teapot flying at a certain orbit as well. Or you can, but not for all such statements.
What would be the criterion for saying that yes, human brain works with language just in the same way as LLMs do? What would be “same”? Logic exists inside defined constraints in the continuous world.
Unless you define what would prove something, you can’t disprove it, but it’s also not a scientific hypothesis. That’s Popper’s criterion.
I know I don’t know, but this is a continuous system and the probability of something being in one particular state is infinitely small ; the probability of it being in certain range of that particular state is, ahem, not, but with the amount of moving things in LLMs and in human brains there are most likely quite a few radical differences between laws describing them.
Why am I incorrect? You can’t disprove that there isn’t that teapot flying at a certain orbit as well. Or you can, but not for all such statements.
What would be the criterion for saying that yes, human brain works with language just in the same way as LLMs do? What would be “same”? Logic exists inside defined constraints in the continuous world.
Unless you define what would prove something, you can’t disprove it, but it’s also not a scientific hypothesis. That’s Popper’s criterion.