Given the above criteria, following are some candidates for unforgivable vulnerabilities
that satisfy all (or most) of the criteria for an unforgivable vulnerability. […]
Buffer overflow using long strings of "A" characters in:
a. Username/password during authentication
b. File or directory name
c. Arguments to most common features of the product or product class
XSS using well-formed <script> tags, especially in the:
a. Username/password of an authentication routine
b. Body, subject, title, or to/from of a message
SQL injection using ' in the:
a. Username/password of an authentication routine
b."id" or other identifier field
c. Numeric field
Remote file inclusion from direct input such as:
a.include($_GET['dir'] . "/config.inc");
Directory traversal using "../.." or "/a/b/c" in GET or SEND commands of frequently-used file sharing functionality (e.g., a GET in a web/FTP server, or a send-file command in a chat client)
World-writable critical files:
a. Executables
b. Libraries
c. Configuration files
Direct requests of administrator scripts
Grow-your-own crypto
Authentication bypass using "authenticated=1" cookie/form field
TOCTOU race condition – symlink
Privilege escalation launching "help" (Windows)
Hard-coded or undocumented account/password
Unchecked length/width/height/size values passed to malloc()/calloc()
Looking into the mentioned unforgivable vulnerabilities and stubborn weaknesses published by CISA:
Unforgivable Vulnerabilities (PDF)
"A"characters in:<script>tags, especially in the:'in the:"id"or other identifier fieldinclude($_GET['dir'] . "/config.inc");"../.."or"/a/b/c"inGETorSENDcommands of frequently-used file sharing functionality (e.g., aGETin a web/FTP server, or a send-file command in a chat client)"authenticated=1"cookie/form field"help"(Windows)malloc()/calloc()Stubborn Weaknesses