What I am disagreeing with is that the “physical worldview” even comes entirely from the empirical evidence to begin with. The empirical evidence gives you a body of mathematics, but you have to apply another layer of philosophical interpretation on top of the mathematics to get to a “physical worldview.”
I thus am arguing that the same body of mathematics, and thus empirical evidence, without any modification at all, is compatible with multiple “physical worldviews,” i.e. different “ways of thinking about it,” and I am arguing that my way of thinking about SR is actually more logically consistent than the standard way.
Energy being conserved is not just practically wrong but empirically wrong, as you said yourself, on large scales you can observe it being wrong and energy conservation failing. I am explicitly talking about different ways of viewing the same body of mathematics where there is no empirical method to distinguish between the two interpretations.
A simple example is fields. Most physicists believe the mathematics of fields, involving the assignment of a set of numbers to every point in space, corresponds to an ontological field, whereby they imagine an invisible object piloting particles around. They always speak of the fields as objects in the world that “cause” things to do something.
But we could equally argue that the mathematics of fields is just a way of describing the dispositions of particles. That is to say, the particles just move on their own. There is no invisible entity piloting them around, but this is not to deny the mathematics of fields, but rather, to interpret the mathematics of fields as a way of describing the dispositions of particles.
The mathematics of fields and the ontology of fields are not the same thing and the former doesn’t necessarily imply the latter. And so we can interpret the same body of mathematics, and thus empirical evidence, without denying the mathematics of fields at all, but only denying the ontology of fields. This would not lead to any new predictions, but it would give you a different way of “thinking about” the same body mathematics.
(I didn’t downvote you FYI. The other person did.)
What I am disagreeing with is that the “physical worldview” even comes entirely from the empirical evidence to begin with. The empirical evidence gives you a body of mathematics, but you have to apply another layer of philosophical interpretation on top of the mathematics to get to a “physical worldview.”
I thus am arguing that the same body of mathematics, and thus empirical evidence, without any modification at all, is compatible with multiple “physical worldviews,” i.e. different “ways of thinking about it,” and I am arguing that my way of thinking about SR is actually more logically consistent than the standard way.
Energy being conserved is not just practically wrong but empirically wrong, as you said yourself, on large scales you can observe it being wrong and energy conservation failing. I am explicitly talking about different ways of viewing the same body of mathematics where there is no empirical method to distinguish between the two interpretations.
A simple example is fields. Most physicists believe the mathematics of fields, involving the assignment of a set of numbers to every point in space, corresponds to an ontological field, whereby they imagine an invisible object piloting particles around. They always speak of the fields as objects in the world that “cause” things to do something.
But we could equally argue that the mathematics of fields is just a way of describing the dispositions of particles. That is to say, the particles just move on their own. There is no invisible entity piloting them around, but this is not to deny the mathematics of fields, but rather, to interpret the mathematics of fields as a way of describing the dispositions of particles.
The mathematics of fields and the ontology of fields are not the same thing and the former doesn’t necessarily imply the latter. And so we can interpret the same body of mathematics, and thus empirical evidence, without denying the mathematics of fields at all, but only denying the ontology of fields. This would not lead to any new predictions, but it would give you a different way of “thinking about” the same body mathematics.
(I didn’t downvote you FYI. The other person did.)