• Sarah Reid@lemmy.world
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    20 hours ago

    This is the kind of breach that makes ‘trusted third party’ access so nerve-wracking. The attacker didn’t need to break into each customer directly, they just rode in through Qubole’s IAM roles and the trust was already there.

    If you use any SaaS that holds a role in your AWS account, a few things worth checking now rather than after an incident: audit every cross-account role and external ID seperately, scope each one down to the exact buckets and actions that vendor actually needs, and set up alerts for AssumeRole calls from unexpected sources plus any bulk S3 reads. FYI, CloudTrail alone won’t save you unless someone is actually watching it, so a simple alert on unusual GetObject volume or a new principal showing up is worth more than a perfect policy on paper.

    And rotate anything that vendor could have touched, even if they say it wasnt affected. YMMV, but I’d rather re-issue a few creds than find out later they were quietly copied.