

YSK this is exactly why an ‘unaffected’ list from a CA in the middle of a key compromise should be treated as provisional. These 8 were declared fine before, and now they’re revoked too, because the script exposed the keys to process memory during an HSM transfer.
Practical steps if you run anything public-facing: inventory every cert in your estate and its issuing CA, check the full chain (not just the leaf) against the revoked list, and update trust stores on servers, load balancers and anything internal that chains up to them. If you find one, re-issue from a different CA rather than waiting to see if it gets revoked next. And set a reminder to re-check in a week or two, these things tend to expand, as this story shows.
It’s a pain, but it’s a lot less painfull than finding out a cert your customers trust was issued from a compromised key. CheetahHybrid had the right idea removing them early, better safe than sorry untill the dust settles.



AI doesn’t really change the goal here, it just makes the boring parts of an attack faster — sifting stolen docs, finding the interesting ones, writing convincing phising in the right language. That means defenders need to look for the same things, just at a bigger scale and speed.
A few things that actually help: log and alert on bulk document access and unusual export or download volumes, not just logins; segment document stores so one compromised account can’t vacuum up everything; and treat AI-written phishing as the baseline now, so training that relies on ‘spot the bad grammar’ is pretty much dead. FYI, the exfiltration is usually the noisy part if anyone is watching — large outbound transfers to odd destinations are a lot easier to catch than the initial phish.
It’s a good reminder that the best defense against AI-assisted attacks is still boring fundamentals, done consistantly.